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On Solid Ground: How Sterling 
Strengthened Airspace Ownership Rights in 
Florida 
Nicolas Torres1 
No other form of property ownership is as synonymous with 
Florida as the condominium. While ownership of airspace was 
possible under common law, modern condominiums are more 
accurately described as creatures of statute. Although the Florida 
Condominium Act (FCA) expressly provides for fee simple 
airspace ownership of condominium property, it had been unclear 
if the Act could provide for fee simple airspace ownership of non–
condominium property. Sterling Breeze v. New Sterling Resorts 
cleared up that ambiguity and found that the FCA can provide for 
fee simple ownership of non–condominium airspace. First, this 
note will review the development of airspace ownership rights as 
they relate to condominiums within both common law and 
statutory regimes. Next, this note will explain key provisions of the 
FCA as well as Florida case law relevant to airspace ownership. 
This note will then discuss Sterling Breeze v. New Sterling Resorts 
which tested whether, under the Florida Condominium Act, non–
condominium airspace can be owned in fee simple if the non–
condominium airspace was described in a condominium 
declaration. Adopting a contract–based approach that looks to 
condominium declarations governed by the FCA, the Sterling 
Breeze court affirmed that non–condominium airspace can be 
owned in fee simple if that airspace was described in the 
declaration creating the condominium. This note will then 
consider potential benefits of the contract–based approach to 
airspace ownership adopted in Sterling Breeze and briefly discuss 
the urban planning and land–use benefits that flow from including 
non–condominium airspace within the FCA’s scope. This note 
 
1 Nicolas Torres is a third–year law student at the University of Miami School of Law. 
Nicolas would like to thank Professor Jessica Owley for her help with shaping and editing 
this paper. 
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concludes with a consideration of how Florida common law may 
also provide for fee simple airspace ownership outside of the 
Florida Condominium Act. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
They dominate the skyline from Jacksonville Beach to South Beach, 
attracting an ever–growing number of homebuyers with the promise of 
luxury amenities and postcard vistas: condominiums.2 Despite the 
economic uncertainty caused by the COVID–19 pandemic, condominium 
and townhome sales in Florida surged 117% year–over–year in the second 
quarter of 2021.3 While condominium ownership is usually associated 
with retirees and foreign investors, the widespread adoption of remote 
work prompted by the COVID–19 pandemic is bringing an influx of new 
residents from metropolitan areas like New York City.4 Although the 
availability of single–family homes is often cited as part of Florida’s lure, 
dwindling supplies of single–family residences,5 and the benefits of 
vertical developments may further spur demand for condominiums in the 
Sunshine State.6   
 
2 See Case Comment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 639, 641 (1975) [hereinafter Condominium Regulation] (explaining that “[i]nstead of 
developing low–cost urban projects designed as primary residences for those who could 
not afford traditional forms of residency ownership, the surge of condominium 
development has been in the high–income market: as resorts  . . .  as second homes, and as 
primary residences in prestige locations.”); See generally Anna Jean Kaiser, Report: 
Condo Inventory at Record Low in South Florida, MIA. HERALD, Aug. 6, 2021, at 17A. 
3 QUARTERLY MARKET DETAIL – Q2 2021 TOWNHOUSES AND CONDOS FLORIDA, FLA. 
REALTORS (2021), https:// archive.floridarealtors.org/ResearchAndStatistics/Florida–
Market–Reports/Index.cfm. 
4 See Michele Lerner, Reverse Snowbirds Making Long–Term Moves to the 
South, BARRON’S: PENTA (Dec. 14, 2020, 11:20 AM), https:// www.barrons.com/articles/
reverse–snowbirds–making–long–term–moves–to–the–south–01607962837 (noting 
increased interest in moving to Florida among luxury residence buyers due to increased 
remote work caused by COVID–19 and Florida’s low tax rates.). 
5 See generally Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Where Have All the Houses 
Gone?, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/upshot/where–
have–all–the–houses–gone.html (noting that homes for sale inventory fell nationwide to a 
multi–year low, with especially steep falls in major metropolitan areas, due to COVID–19 
related factors, new housing starts that have trended below historic averages, and low 
mortgage interest rates.). 
6 See Katherine Kallergis & Jordan Pandy, Buyers Shift to Condos as Waterfront 
Single–Family Luxury Inventory Dwindles in South Florida, THE REAL DEAL: S. FLA., 
(Jan. 19, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://therealdeal.com/miami/2021/01/19/buyers–shift–to–
condos–as–waterfront–single–family–luxury–inventory–dwindles–in–south–
florida/ (arguing that a 30 percent year–over–year jump in condominium and townhome 
2021] UNIVERISTY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 31 
 
Condominium buildings present opportunities to house a growing 
population while reducing land use, bolstering energy efficiency, and 
cutting down more efficiently on traffic pollution by reducing commute 
times.7 Condominium buildings and other forms of vertical development 
also present new opportunities to use and monetize airspace both inside 
and outside of buildings. Developing new approaches to airspace use 
present airspace owners with opportunities to monetize previously unused 
parts of fee simple estates.8 Vertical development has attracted interest 
from environmentally minded residents and developers who recognize that 
condominiums and other multi–story developments offer greater energy 
efficiency than single family homes and stand–alone commercial 
properties while reducing total land use and lowering commute times.9 
The pairing of residential and commercial units on condominium 
buildings—commonly known as mixed–used developments—offer a way 
to meet growing demand for condominiums and support local economic 
development while consolidating property users into more efficient 
vertical arrangements. However, bringing vertical development and fee 
simple ownership of resulting residential properties together requires that 
a fee simple estate in airspace itself be created, owned, and conveyed, 
separate and apart from any underlying land or structure. The unique 
geography and ownership structure of a condominium offer new ways to 
understand the fundamental elements of fee simple ownership. Moreover, 
these disputes provide practical guidance to condominium developers on 
how to ensure that non–residential units will benefit from the protections 
offered by condominium statutes. 
In Sterling Breeze Owners’ Association, Inc. v. New Sterling, LLC, the 
First District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected an attempt by a 
homeowners’ association to gain ownership of commercial units located 
inside a condominium building but that were not owned by either the 
 
sales in Miami–Dade was caused by a “dwindl[ing]” supply of single–family homes as 
well as lifestyle and tax considerations.). 
7 See generally Jason Plautz, Did Covid Lockdowns Really Clear the Air?, BLOOMBERG 
CITYLAB (Dec. 21, 2020, 3:36 PM https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-
21/what-covid-lockdowns-did-for-urban-air-pollution (noting that “[s]atellite monitoring 
and roadway data show that nitrogen oxides linked to automobiles were down worldwide 
after lockdowns began, sometimes by as much as 50% in certain locations.”). 
8 See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 288–
89 (2011) (noting that “vertical building designs are commonly viewed as relatively 
ecofriendly approaches to real estate development” because high–rise developments can 
lower energy consumption, allows more land to be used for green spaces, reduces the need 
for public infrastructure, and reduces traffic levels.). 
9 Id. 
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condominium association or a condominium owner.10 The 22 story tall 
building housed 145 residential units along with four commercial units 
located on the ground floor.11 All four units were owned and operated by 
New Sterling Resorts with one unit housing a wine bar, another unit 
housing a guest gym, a third unit housing a laundry facility and the fourth 
unit being used as a storage room.12 While these commercial units were in 
a condominium building, the governing documents expressly provided 
that the units would be classified as commercial units and not as  
condominium units.13 The condominium association argued that the 
Florida Condominium Act (FCA), which provides for fee simple airspace 
ownership and governs the creation and operation of condominiums only 
permits the ownership of fee simple absolute in airspace if that airspace is 
owned either by a homeowner as a condominium unit or by a 
condominium association as a common element like a lobby, hallway, or 
recreational area.14 With no other statutes or opinions providing for 
airspace ownership, the association argued that the commercial units did 
not fall within the scope of the FCA and could not be owned by New 
Sterling.15 The court rejected the association’s argument and affirmed the 
lower court’s finding that the FCA permits airspace inside a condominium 
building to be owned in fee simple absolute without requiring that airspace 
to be either a condominium unit or a common element as long as the 
excluded units and the condominium were created in compliance with the 
FCA.16 
Sterling shows that Florida courts can extend key benefits of the 
FCA—especially, fee simple ownership of airspace—to units located in a 
condominium building even if those units are not condominium units or 
common elements. Moreover, the decision offers greater clarity on how a 
fee simple absolute in airspace can be created, conveyed, and owned under 
Florida law. In turn, the decision provides lawyers, owners, and developers 
with practical guidance that can be used to more precisely tailor ownership 
structures implemented in condominiums and vertical developments more 
generally. Given the economic and urban–planning benefits offered by 
vertical developments like high–rise, mixed–use buildings, Sterling may 
 
10 See Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n v. New Sterling Resorts, LLC, 255 So. 3d 434, 
435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). 
11 Id. at 435–36. 
12 Id. at 436. 
13 See id. at 435. 
14 See id. at 436. ; See FLA. STAT. § 718.108(1)(a) (2021)  (providing that a 
condominium’s common elements include “condominium property which is not included 
within the units.”). 
15 Sterling Breeze, 255 So. 3d at 437. 
16 Id. 
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stoke developer and owner interest in these developments by providing the 
necessary flexibility in ownership structures that can maximize occupancy 
in those developments. 
First, this note briefly looks at the development of airspace ownership 
in the United States. The common law has long accommodated fee simple 
ownership of airspace separate and apart from fee simple ownership of the 
underlying land or a given building. Alongside the common law, Florida, 
like most states, has adopted statutes permitting fee simple absolute 
ownership of airspace when that airspace is part of a condominium.17 This 
note provides a brief overview of the benefits provided to owners by the 
most common provisions found in condominium statutes. Next, this note 
details the benefits of Florida’s approach to airspace ownership as 
embodied both in the FCA and the broad contractual freedom Florida 
courts have found when interpreting the statute. This note discusses how 
the Sterling court broadened the scope of “land” under the FCA to 
encompass airspace parcels that are excluded from condominium 
ownership and in a building dominated by condominium units. Sterling 
shows that the FCA provides for ownership of non–condominium airspace 
parcels as long as those parcels were created with an FCA compliant 
governing document.18 By extending the FCA’s protections to 
independent owners in condominium buildings, the Sterling court 
provided the clearest guidance yet that the FCA’s protections can 
encompass all airspace parcels inside a condominium building.19  More 
importantly, Sterling shows that the FCA’s provisions can extend to all 
airspace parcels described in a condominium’s governing document even 
if some of those described parcels will not be owned as condominium units 
or common elements.20 Finally, this note will address the practical 
implications of the Sterling decision with an eye towards anticipating 
circumstances that could test the limits of Sterling’s holding. 
 
17 Marlene Brit, Terminating a Condominium or Terminating Property Rights: A 
Distinction Without a Difference 45 Real Estate L. J. 200, 201 (2016) (noting that 
“[c]condominiums are creates of statute” which “means the existence of condominiums is 
only allowed by the granting power of a statute); Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, 
at 639 (noting that, following an emended to the National Housing Act of 1961 that 
permitted mortgage insurance for condominiums, “most states subsequently approved 
enabling legislation providing the legal framework necessary to the development of” 
condominiums). 
18 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (upholding the conveyance of four airspace parcels that were 
created through a statutorily compliant declaration but that were expressly excluded from 
the resulting condominium via that declaration). 
19 Id. (finding that the FCA’s definition of land that facilitates fee simple absolute 
ownership of airspace continued to apply to non–condominium airspace parcels created via 
a declaration although those parcels were excluded from the resulting condominium). 
20 Id. (holding that title to non–condominium airspace parcels could be held by an owner 
other than either a condominium owner or a condominium owners’ association). 
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II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COMMON LAW AND 
STATUTORY AIRSPACE RIGHTS 
Condominiums are often associated with modern cities and surging 
urban development following in the middle of the 20th century.21 
However, vertically dividing the interior of a single building to create 
several distinct parcels has been a popular housing solution for centuries.22 
American courts often barred the recognition of fee simple absolute in 
airspace when the airspace owner did not own the terrestrial parcel.23 With 
rapid population growth in American cities fueling housing demand, 
legislators stepped in to ensure that airspace could be owned in fee simple 
separate and apart from underlying ground and to assure developers, 
investors, and owners that the benefits of fee simple ownership would be 
consistently granted to airspace parcels.24 This section will provide a brief 
overview of common law airspace ownership and key features of 
condominiums statutes that have been broadly adopted to provide for fee 
simple airspace ownership and to address the practical challenges that 
vertical developments can pose to an owner’s right to use her fee. 
A. Common law condominiums in Europe and America 
It is axiomatic that the holder of fee simple in a land also owns some 
portion of the airspace contained within and extended from her property. 
However, fee simple ownership of airspace, separate and apart from the 
underlying ground, is a relatively new form of ownership that was 
“virtually unknown to the American legal community before the 1960s.”25 
While possible under the common law, airspace ownership is a creature of 
statute in North America as a general matter and specifically in Florida. 
Although the ad coelum rule is an ancient common law doctrine, 
ownership of different floors within the same building has been possible 
since at least the Middle Ages and perhaps as early as the First Dynasty in 
 
21 See Charles W. Pittman, Land Without Earth—The Condominium, 15. U. FLA. L. 
REV. 203, 203 (1962) (noting that by the early 1960’s, the “rush to the suburbs of the fifties 
[was]  . . .  reversed in many areas and people [began] returning to the cities.”). 
22 See id. at 205 n.14 (noting that “the first widespread use of separate ownership of parts 
of buildings occurred in Germany” in the 1100s.). 
23 See id. at 206–07 (noting that “[i]n the United States the practice [of vertically 
dividing ownership interests] has not been commonplace” and that recognition of “separate 
ownership of parts of buildings” varied widely before the passage of condominium acts.). 
24 See Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 639 (noting that “condominiums were 
virtually unknown to the American legal community before the 1960’s” saw a wave of 
condominium statutes enacted in the United States.). 
25 Id.; See also Stuart S. Ball, Division into Horizontal Strata of the Landspace Above 
the Surface, 39 YALE L.J. 616, 621–22 (1930) (recounting two English cases decided in 
the 1780s which show “support of the rule that a room can be separately owned.”). 
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modern–day Iraq (ancient Babylon).26 Multi–family residences in which 
owners held title to separate units along with a share in the building itself 
were common in Germany as early as the 1100s.27 
While regulation of ownership in these proto–condos was 
accomplished “more by usage and tradition than by formal legal rules,”28 
some European civil codes dating back to the 19th century did address 
airspace ownership. The Code of Napoleon of 1804, for example, not only 
permitted the ownership of separate floors within the same building it also 
provided for how the physical boundaries of those estates would be 
determined and how expenses would be shared for common elements.29 
However, civil codes in France, Scotland, and Germany limited ownership 
of a building to the owner of the underlying land.30 As the demand for new 
housing and development rose following World War II, these same 
countries began permitting ownership of discrete parts of a building.31 
Unlike their European counterparts, U.S. jurisdictions were slow to 
adopt statutes expressly permitting distinct fee simple absolutes in 
airspace within a single building. Although some areas of law, including 
mining and aviation, supplied “indirect support for the legality of strata 
ownership of buildings.” 32 Examples of these subsurface and airspace 
statutes include the General Mining Law of 1872,33 which permitted 
private citizens to purchase mineral deposits from the federal government, 
and the Federal Aviation Act which, by recognizing the “public right of 
freedom of transit through navigable airspace,”34 implied an upper 
boundary to the fee simple estates below that airspace. As in Europe, 
growing demand for housing and commercial space in U.S. cities 
following WWII spurred legislators to encourage vertical development by 
 
26 See William K. Kerr, Condominium—Statutory Implementation, 38 St. John’s 
L. Rev. 1, 3 (1963). 
27 Ball, supra note 21, at 638 (citing RUDOLF HUEBNER, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC 
PRIVATE LAW 172–73 (Francis S. Philbrick trans., Ass’n Am. L. Schs., Cont’l Legal Hist. 
Ser. No. 4, 1918)). 
28 Donna S. Bennett, Condominium Homeownership in the United States: A Selected 
Annotated Bibliography of Legal Sources, 103 L. LIBR. J. 249, 250 (2011). 
29 Kerr, supra note 22, at 3. 
30 Id.; See Ball, supra note 21, at 621–49 (describing Canadian, Scottish, French, and 
German laws and court decisions which permitted buildings to be divided into several 
estates each owned by a different person). 
31 William Schwartz, Condominium: A Hybrid Castle in the Sky, 44 B.U. L. REV. 
137, 137–38 (1964) (quoting Herbert J. Friedman & James K. Herbert, Comment, 
Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50 CAL. L. REV. 299, 299 
(1962)). 
32 Charles W. Pittman, Note, Land Without Earth – The Condominium, 15 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 203, 207 (1963). 
33 30 U.S.C. § 22. 
34 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–726, § 104, 72 Stat. 737, 740 (1958). 
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adopting modern condominium statutes that permit fee simple in airspace 
as long as that airspace is enclosed in a condominium building.35 
By the early 20th century “most common law jurisdictions recognized 
rights of ownership in the space both superjacent and subjacent to the 
surface of the soil.”36 Before the widespread adoption of condominium 
statutes, ownership of a parcel inside of a vertical development could take 
two distinct forms. The first form would convey ownership of an airspace 
parcel that was bound by “the walls, floor and ceiling.”37 This ownership 
model would convey a portion of the building’s physical structure—the 
walls, floors, and ceilings that surround the living space—and would then 
be “coupled with either an easement or possessory right relating to the 
space enclosed by the architectural boundaries.”38 
The second form airspace ownership possible at common law was “a 
right of ownership  . . .  relating to the space enclosed as well as to the 
inclosing matter.”39 In this model, the owner would own both the 
structures that surround the unit and the airspace enclosed between those 
structures. However, this second form of airspace ownership posed “a 
practical question” as to whether the owner was granted a fee simple 
absolute in airspace that would survive destruction of the building or if the 
owner was granted a fee that would be defeated if the building was 
destroyed.40 If ownership “follows  . . .  the walls” the airspace owner’s 
fee would be defeated and “the owner of the [underlying] lot retains the 
fee to his sold land column.”41 Several early American, English, and 
Canadian cases show courts considering disputes between owners 
occupying different stories in the same building.42 Before condominium 
statutes codified fee simple in airspace, common law courts often found 
that the fee granted to the simple defeasible by a condition subsequent that 
would be “defeated by the destruction of the building.”43 These defeasible 
fees created the risk that, if the building is destroyed, the owner of a lower 
 
35 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 137; See generally John E. Cribbet, Condominium—
Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1212–13 (1963) (recounting 
how the Horizontal Property Act adopted by Puerto Rico in 1951 in response to a housing 
shortage was a model for subsequent statutes adopted by other American jurisdictions). 
36 Ball, supra note 21, at 616 (citing Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in 
Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 644 (1928)). 





42 Id. at 621–26 (describing cases heard by courts in England, Canada, and the United 
States during the 1700s and 1800s that found that owners of upper floors in multi–story 
buildings were only granted a fee simple defeasible by condition subsequent that was 
“defeated by the destruction of the building.”). 
43 Id. at 624. 
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floor could prevent the owner of an upper floor from rebuilding because 
ownership of the airspace would revert back to the lower floor owner who 
had conveyed the upper floor.44 
Recognizing that multi–story buildings pose unique threats to an 
owner’s right to use her upper floor fee, English and American courts 
strengthened the rights available to an airspace owner to use her fee. An 
early 20th century Supreme Court of Iowa case neatly illustrates the threat 
posed to an owner’s right to use her parcel by the owner of an adjoining 
parcel located in the same building.45 In Weaver v. Osbourne, Osbourne’s 
predecessor in interest conveyed the upper–story of a two story building 
to Weaver.46 The deed expressly conveyed “[a]ll of the 2d story of  . . .  
[the] building commencing 13 ft. from the foundation.”47 The deed also 
contained a covenant permitting “either party” to rebuild his part of the 
building “[i]n case of fire.”48 
The building burned down, and Osbourne made plans to rebuild the 
first floor.49 However, Osbourne wanted to prohibit Weaver from 
rebuilding the second floor.50 Finding support for the conveyance of an 
interest in “a distinct part of a building may be made with covenants, 
agreements, or conditions creating rights in the grantee which will survive 
the destruction,” the Iowa Supreme Court held that the covenant only 
controlled what each owner did with his own property. Because Osbourne 
only held title to the first floor, he could only decide whether to rebuild his 
portion of the building.51 Weaver was permitted to rebuild, but the 
dimensions of the new structure had to conform with the dimensions of 
the previous structure.52 
The grantor may rebuild, but he is not bound to do so. If 
he does rebuild, the grantees may rebuild the second story, 
but are not bound to do so. If this be the true interpretation 
of the contract, then, while the grantor may refrain from 
rebuilding and incur no liability to the grantees, he is not 
at liberty to rebuild and deny the grantees the exercise of 
 
44 Id. at 621–26 (describing “numerous cases” in England, Canada, and the United States 
wherein courts “followed the rule . . . that the destruction of the physical premises was also 
a destruction of the fee.”). 
45 Id. at 631 (citing Weaver v. Osborne, 134 N.W. 103 (Iowa 1912)). 
46 Weaver, 134 N.W. at 104. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 105. 
49 Id. at 104. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 106. 
52 Id. (holding that the “appellants[] [can] exercise . . . their right to rebuild the second 
story to a length corresponding with that of the building destroyed.”). 
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their “option” to construct the second story; nor can he, 
we think, be allowed to accomplish the same result by the 
indirect method of changing the dimensions of the new 
structure.53 
Weaver is remarkable for two reasons. First, it shows that American 
courts recognized that not all airspace fees terminated when a building was 
destroyed. The court observed Weaver could have acquired a defeasible 
fee that would have only granted Weaver to ownership of the physical 
structure encompassing the three–dimensional space.54 If the rebuilding 
covenant not been in place, Weaver would have only held “title to the 
second story of the building then in existence” and, once the second story 
was destroyed, “the instrument would have ceased to be of any legal force 
or effect, because the subject–matter of the conveyance had itself ceased 
to exist.”55 Had Weaver acquired a defeasible fee without an optional right 
to rebuild, Weaver would not be able to “exercise  . . .  right to rebuild the 
second story to a length corresponding with that of the building 
destroyed.”56 Instead, the court found the deed granted Weaver a qualified 
right to use the airspace that occupied the second story.57 By limiting 
Weaver’s right to rebuild to the portion of airspace occupied by the second 
floor at the time of conveyance Weaver shows American courts recognized 
that airspace could be divided into fixed, discrete units just as land can be 
divided into parcels. 
Second, the court’s deference to the plain language of the rebuilding 
option in the deed  mirrors the contract–based approach contemporary 
courts, including Florida courts, and condominium statutes have adopted 
when determining an owner’s right to use airspace. While the Weaver 
court does not expressly permit fee simple absolute in airspace, the 
decision shows that a right to use airspace can survive the destruction of 
the surrounding building as long as an enforceable contract directly or 
implicitly granting that right is found.58 The ample support the Weaver 
court found to enforce the rebuild provision shows that American courts 
had little trouble extending easements, covenants, and other use 
agreements to airspace.59 Under Weaver, the owner of a unit in a multi–




55 Id. at 105. 
56 Id. at 106. 
57 See Id. at 106. 
58 Id. at 105. 
59 Id. (“[T[he authority of the owner of such property to burden it with easements and 
with covenants running with the title is so well established, it is unnecessary to dwell longer 
upon the point.”). 
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fee in an upper story but the deed alone would not convey a fee simple 
absolute.60 
Engineering advancements that gave rise to skyscrapers and airplanes 
required American courts to reevaluate airspace ownership. The need to 
recognize airspace ownership under common law while accommodating 
new airspace uses was explained by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Causby.61 Causby was a unique takings claim brought by Thomas Lee 
Causby, a North Carolinian chicken farmer whose farm was located 
directly underneath a flight path used by a nearby Army base.62 The Court 
held that the flight path was a taking under the Fifth Amendment and that 
Causby was entitled to just compensation. 
The Court observed that “low altitude” “superadjacent airspace  . . .  is 
so close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the 
surface of the land itself.”63 Because airspace use could interfere with an 
owner’s use and enjoyment of the underlying land, a landowner does “as 
an incident to his ownership, ha[ve] a claim to [the adjacent airspace] and 
that invasions of [the adjacent airspace] in the same category as invasions 
of the surface.”64 While Causby’s ownership extended into the three–
dimensional space above his farm, the Court was also careful to note that 
a growing need for airspace use to facilitate airplane travel requires that 
some “airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part 
of the public domain.”65 
As the Court observed, the ad coelum rule has “no place in the modern 
world” where new airspace uses require courts to be responsive to the 
rights of landowners and the public needs like national defense.66 
However, the Court declined to fix the “precise limits” of a landowner’s 
claim on the airspace above her land.67 Moreover, Causby did not address 
whether airspace could be owned in fee simple apart from the underlying 
land nor did the decision establish a definitive upper boundary for a 
terrestrial fee simple.68 Although cases like Weaver and Casuby recognize 
that airspace can be owned, fee simple absolute ownership of airspace 
required legislative action to overcome the common law’s unwillingness 
to break away from the ad coelum doctrine.69 
 
60 Id. at 106. 
61 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). 
62 Id. at 258–59. 
63 Id. at 265. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 266. 
66 Id. at 260–61. 
67 Id. at 266. 
68 See id. at 256–75. 
69 See 2A C.J.S. Aeronautics & Aerospace § 2 (2021) (noting that the “owner of 
property has air rights to so much of the superjacent airspace as the owner can use”); Herrin 
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B. Condominium Statutes Codified Common Law Principals 
Permitting Airspace Ownership and Addressed Threats to an 
Owner’s Right to Use 
Although condominiums were possible under common law,70 
condominium statutes clarified the uncertain status of fee simple absolute 
ownership in airspace at common law.71 These statutes were primarily 
designed to resolve these uncertainties by codifying fee simple absolute 
ownership of airspace that is confined between walls but is owned separate 
and apart from underlying land. In turn, legislators hoped this codification 
would encourage condominium development and ownership by assuring 
developers, investors, and title companies that condominiums would 
benefit from the full complement of property rights and protections 
granted to terrestrial parcels.72 Moreover, recognizing the proximity and 
structural interrelation of units in a vertical development, these statutes 
generally provide heightened protections to each owner’s right to use her 
fee. The heightened protections these statutes offer unit owners are 
accomplished by two principal means: preventing owners from being able 
to force partition of shared elements like hallways and ingresses73 and 
providing mechanisms for developers and condominium associations to 
force unit owners to permit reconstruction of surrounding units.74 
The first—and for purposes of analyzing Sterling the most 
important—feature that all modern condominium statutes share is 
allowing and protecting “exclusive ownership of airspace, with essential 
concomitants of common ownership.”75 The statutes, including the FCA, 
permit the partitioning of three–dimensional airspace into discrete units 
 
v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 332 (Mont. 1925) (citing Blackstone for the proposition that land 
“in its legal signification has an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards; whoever 
owns the land possesses all the space upwards to an indefinite extent; such is the maxim of 
the law”); Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1902) (holding that, with 
respects to actions for ejectment, “space above land is real estate the same as the land itself” 
and that the “law regards the empty space as if it were a solid, inseparable from the soil” 
so that “an owner is entitled to the absolute and undisturbed possession of every part of his 
premises, including the space above, as much as a mine beneath”). 
70 Mark B. Davis, Some Considerations in Establishing a Planned Community, THE 
PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER 71, 76 (1985). 
71 Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 640–41 (noting that, prior to condominium 
statutes, a fee interest in airspace could be constructed and paired with “an undivided 
percentage interest as tenant–in–common in the structural parts and other facilities” 
encompassed by a building). 
72 Id. at 641. 
73 Id. (noting that, at common law, “any one tenant–in–common could, at his whim, 
bring the tenancy to an abrupt end and destroyed the underlying legal structure.”). 
74 Davis, supra note 66, at 76. 
75 Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 640 (quoting DAVID CLURMAN & EDNA L. 
HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 2–3 (1st ed. 1970)). 
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that can all be separately held in fee simple absolute.76 As Causby and 
Weaver show, American courts affirmed that airspace could be held either 
as part of a fee simple absolute in the underlying land or as a defeasible 
fee separate and apart from underlying land.77 However, the lack of 
consistent, express rules permitting a fee simple absolute in airspace 
sperate and apart from underlying land prompted legislators to adopt 
condominium statutes.78 Condominium statutes grant airspace parcels the 
“attributes of real estate” so that the airspace can be “separately owned, 
conveyed, devised, inherited, and mortgaged.”79 By expressly permitting 
fee simple in airspace, condominium statutes provided important 
assurances to early investors that the titles to the airspace would be 
enforceable. 80 Moreover, because owners are granted an “exclusive 
estate” in their units rather than defeasible fees in portions of a building, 
most condominium statutes ensure that the “unit owner’s interest in the 
cubicle of space described by his deed remains intact” even if the building 
is destroyed.81 
Modern condominium statutes also provide condominium owners 
with strong protections of their right to use the airspace parcels by granting 
each fee holder an enforceable ownership interest in the shared elements 
of a building. Pairing fee simple ownership of separate airspace units with 
a tenancy–in–common to share ownership of a building’s common 
elements was likely possible at common law.82 However, condominium 
statutes streamline what would otherwise be an “extremely complex” 
process of describing the tenancy–in–common’s property by 
 
76 FLA. STAT. § 718.103(18) (2020) (providing that, for the purposes of the Florida 
Condominium Act, land “means the surface of a legally described parcel of real property 
and includes, unless otherwise specified in the declaration and whether separate from or 
including such surface, airspace lying above and subterranean space lying below such 
surface.”). 
77 Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 641 (noting that, prior to the enactment of 
condominium statutes, “[o]ne could construct a fee interest in airspace” under common 
law.). 
78 Id. at 640–41 (“Even in the absence of specific condominium enabling legislation, the 
common law provided the basic framework for individual ownership of apartment units” 
as well as a “free interest in airspace and  . . .  an undivided percentage interest as tenant–
in–common in the structural parts and other facilities.”). 
79 Kerr, supra note 22, at 2. 
80 Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 641; Davis, supra note 66, at 76 (noting 
that “[t]he financial industry’s doubts about the enforceability of [using covenants to 
prohibit tenants–in–common from invoking the common law right to partition] were a 
practical impediment to the growth” of condominiums.). 
81 Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. 
REV. 987, 1013 (1963). 
82 See Davis, supra note 66, at 76. 
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simultaneously granting individual owners a fee simple in the airspace 
comprising their units and a share in the tenancy–in–common.83 
To further protect each owner’s right to use both her unit and common 
elements, legislators favored a contract–based approach that requires 
owners and tenancy–in–commons to delineate the rights granted and 
restrictions imposed on the owners, the tenancy–in–common, and the 
association. The bulk of this regulatory work is accomplished through a 
condominium declaration.84 A condominium declaration is a governing 
document that must meet certain criteria set out in a state’s condominium 
statute.85 These criteria typically include metes–and–bounds descriptions 
of all of the individual units as well as the common elements, a 
requirement that “[a]ll persons who have record title to the interest in the 
land being submitted to condominium owners  . . .  must join  . . .  the 
declaration,” and a requirement that the declaration be recorded with a 
specified public office.86 The declarations are not deeds, although they do 
describe the various parcels in a building.87 The declaration is both the 
agreement that creates the condominium as a legal entity and the document 
that sets out the rights allocated to the owners.88 Once the condominium is 
created, the property submitted to condominium ownership via the 
declaration will be governed by provisions in the declaration.89 While the 
statutes do set out certain rules that cannot be modified by a declaration—
for example, condominium statutes in New York and Florida only permit 
common elements to be owned by a tenancy–in–common—the statutes 
typically allow condominium statutes generally permit other provisions to 
be included in the declaration as long as those provisions are not 
inconsistent with other provisions of the state’s real property law.90 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 73. 
85 See Kerr, supra note 21, at 22; See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2)–(7) (2020) 
(explaining the information that must be included in a condominium declaration). 
86 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(a)–(e). 
87 See, e.g., id. § 718.104(4)(d) (requiring that a condominium declaration contain “[a]n 
identification of each unit by letter, name, or number, or combination thereof, so that no 
unit bears the same designation as any other unit.”). 
88 Kerr, supra note 22, at 22–23 (“[R]ecording the declaration brings into effect all the 
provisions of the [FCA] as respects the building or project, the apartment and common 
elements.”). 
89 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.104(6) (“A person who joins in, or consents to the 
execution of, a declaration subjects his or her interest in the condominium property to the 
provisions of the declaration.”). 
90 See, id. § 718.104(m) (permitting “[o]ther desired provisions not inconsistent with 
this chapter” to be included in an enforceable condominium declaration). 
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III.  “LAND,” AIR, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE FLORIDA 
CONDOMINIUM ACT 
Despite the care modern condominium statutes take to advantage fee 
simple owners and diminish potential interferences with an owner’s right 
to use her airspace parcel, the rights available to unit owners and a 
condominium’s tenancy–in–common become less clear when a unit owner 
is not also a member of the tenancy–in–common. Condominium statutes, 
including the FCA, primarily contemplate an ownership structure wherein 
each fee simple owner is also a tenant–in–common in the condominium 
common elements and a member of the condominium association.91 As 
the following overview of Florida’s Condominium Act and key Florida 
court decisions concerning airspace property rights will show, 
commonplace arrangements in vertical developments, such as mixed–use 
buildings, are not always clearly addressed either by Florida statute or 
common law. Disputes between condominium owners and owners of non–
condominium airspace parcels, like the dispute in Sterling, force Florida 
courts to consider whether condominium statutes address all air space 
parcels located inside of in a condominium building or whether the FCA’s 
reach is limited to property that has been submitted to condominium 
ownership. As this note will show, Sterling offers a practical solution to 
determining whether a property is governed by the FCA that turns to the 
contractual agreements created by a condominium declaration. Moreover, 
Sterling demonstrates that Florida courts strive to preserve the 
Condominium Act’s strong protections of an owner’s right to use her 
airspace parcel when resolving ownership disputes involving 
condominium and non–condominium airspace parcel. 
A. Key Provisions of The Florida Condominium Act 
Like similar statutes, the FCA provides for the ownership of a fee 
simple absolute title in airspace and delineates the rights of owners, 
developers, and associations. Under the FCA, a condominium is a form of 
real property that is “comprised entirely of units that may be owned by one 
or more persons, and in which there is, appurtenant to each unit, an 
undivided share in common elements.”92 Under Florida law, a 
condominium can only be created under the Condominium Act.93 
 
91 See id. § 718.103(11) (defining condominium as a “form of ownership of real 
property created pursuant to this chapter, which is comprised entirely of units that may be 
owned by one or more persons, and in which there is, appurtenant to each unit, an undivided 
share in common elements”). 
92 Id. § 718.103(11). 
93 Cohn v. Grand Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 62 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 2011). 
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Rather than creating a fee simple absolute in airspace that is distinct 
from a terrestrial parcel, the FCA expands the meaning of land to 
encompass “the surface of a legally described parcel of real property and 
includes, unless otherwise specified in the declaration and whether 
separate from or including such surface, airspace lying above and 
subterranean space lying below such surface.”94 As Sterling shows, this 
definition includes ground floor units located in a condominium building 
as long as those units are described in a condominium declaration.95 While 
a condominium parcel refers to a unit “together with the undivided share 
in the common elements appurtenant to the unit”96 each unit only 
encompasses the “property which is subject to exclusive ownership.”97 For 
the purposes of the FCA, a unit owner is the “record owner of legal title to 
the condominium parcel.”98 
On its face, the FCA seems to only address owners who are both the 
(1) legal title holder of a condominium unit and (2) owner of a share in the 
condominium’s tenancy–in–common. When all airspace units in a 
building are owned by a unit owner as defined in the FCA, this pairing of 
fee simple ownership and a share in the tenancy–in–common makes 
practical sense. In that situation, all the property in the building will either 
be owned by a unit owner or the tenancy–in–common. However, as the 
Sterling decision shows, it is not immediately clear whether the FCA’s 
scope includes airspace parcels that are not a part of a condominium, but 
that are in a condominium building, or that such a category could exist 
under the FCA. 
Like most condominium statutes, the FCA requires that a deceleration 
be recoded to create a condominium and submit property to the FCA’s 
provisions.99 Condominiums can either be created by a developer who 
“creates a condominium or offers condominium parcels for sale or lease 
in the ordinary course of business”100 or by a cooperative association 
which elects to convert an existing residential cooperative.101 The 
 
94 FLA. STAT. § 718.103(18) (providing that, for the purposes of the FCA, a declaration 
can use the term land to also “mean all or any portion of the airspace or subterranean space 
between two legally identifiable elevations and may exclude the surface of a parcel of real 
property and may mean any combination of the foregoing, whether or not contiguous, or 
may mean a condominium unit.”). 
95 Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n v. New Sterling Resorts, LLC, 255 So. 3d 434, 436 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2018). 
96 FLA. STAT. § 718.103(12). 
97 Id. § 718.103(27). 
98 Id. § 718.103(28). 
99 FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (2020) (providing that a “condominium is created by 
recording a declaration”). 
100 FLA. STAT. § 718.103(16) 
101 See id. § 718.103(16)(b). 
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declaration must be joined by “[a]ll persons who have record title to the 
interest in the land being submitted to condominium ownership.”102 The 
declaration must describe all units that will be “located in or on the 
land.”103 Under the statute, a unit is “a part of the condominium property 
which is subject to exclusive ownership” including any “improvements, 
land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the 
declaration.”104 The FCA also provides for “all exhibits and all 
amendments” appended to a declaration to be recorded “as an agreement 
relating to the conveyance of land.”105 
The declaration must also fix the undivided ownership share each 
owner will receive in the condominium’s common elements.106 Common 
elements include “property which is not included within units” as well as 
easements for utility equipment, an “easement of support in every portion 
of a unit which contributes to the support of a building,” and any other 
areas designated as common elements in the deceleration.107 If a 
condominium contains both residential and commercial units, the 
condominium is a mixed–use condominium for the purposes of the 
statute.108 However, a mixed–use designation only subjects those 
condominiums to three special provisions, all of which relate to how 
authority and voting rights will be allocated in mixed–use 
condominiums.109 Other than these special provisions, the FCA subjects 
both commercial and residential units created via a condominium 
deceleration to the same rules and requirements. Thus, just like their pure 
condominium counterparts, developers, associations, and owners in 
mixed–use condominium buildings must use the condominium 
declaration, bylaws, and other written instruments to establish the rights, 
 
102 FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2). 
103 Id. 
104 FLA. STAT. § 718.103(27) 
105 FLA. STAT. § 718.105(1) (2020) (providing that “[w]hen executed as required by s. 
718.104, a declaration together with all exhibits and all amendments is entitled to 
recordation as an agreement relating to the conveyance of land.”). 
106 Fla. Stat. §718.104(4)(f). 
107 Fla. Stat. §718.108 (1)–(2) (2020). 
108 Fla. Stat. §718.103 (23). 
109 Fla. Stat. 718. 404 (1)–(3) (providing that no commercial unit owner can be granted 
authority to veto amendments to a condominium’s governing documents as well as 
entitling residential unit owners to vote for the majority of the seats for a condominium 
board if the residential units account for at least 50% of “total units operated by the 
association” and establishing a per–square–foot formula to allocate ownership shares in 
common elements for mixed–use condominiums created during or after 1996). 
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benefits, and obligations that will be assigned to the residential and 
commercial unit owners.110 
B.  Florida Courts Have Upheld Ownership of Airspace Rights 
in Non–Condominium Property 
Despite the popularity of condominiums in the Sunshine State, Florida 
courts have had few opportunities to consider whether airspace can be 
owned in fee simple absolute. While condominiums are now exclusively 
governed by the Condominium Act, Florida courts upheld property 
interests in airspace well before the FCA’s passage in 1963.111 Instead of 
barring property interests in airspace by strictly applying the ad coelum 
doctrine, Florida courts have generally upheld limited property interests in 
airspace on finding an enforceable agreement like an easement that grants 
party the right to use three–dimensional space that adjoins a terrestrial 
parcel. Three key state court decisions support upholding fee simple 
absolute ownership of non–condominium airspace parcels under Florida 
law. These three decisions address two of the primary issues that the 
Condominium Act also addresses: (1) the use of contracts to regulate 
ownership and use rights and (2) the existence of a property interest in 
airspace in separate and apart from the underlying ground. While the FCA 
codified both (1) the use of written instruments to create and convey 
ownership in airspace and (2) the ability to hold a property interest in 
airspace, these decisions show that, even if the excluded parcels had not 
come within the scope of the FCA, Florida common law can accommodate 
fee simple absolute ownership of airspace. 
i. Florida Courts Defer To Contracts When Resolving Real 
Property Ownership Disputes 
In Legendary Inc. V. Destin Yacht Club Owners Ass’n Inc. (1998), the 
First District Court of Appeal of Florida reaffirmed that Florida courts 
prefer to use contract principles when examining condominium 
agreements, including agreements that assign ownership rights to property 
that is connected to but that is not a part of a condominium.112 Legendary 
Inc. owned an associated commercial parcel (“ACP”) located in a 
 
110 Richard C. Grant & Cheryl L. Hastings, Mixed–Use Communities and Mixed–Use 
Buildings, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS 9–26, 9–28 (Josine R. 
Blackwell et al. eds., 10th ed. 2020). 
111 Cf. Gary A. Poliakoff, The Florida Condominium Act, 16 NOVA L. REV. 471, 
474 (1991) (stating that the Florida Condominium Act was enacted to recognize air rights). 
112 Legendary, Inc. v. Destin Yacht Club Owners Ass’n, Inc., 724 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1998). 
2021] UNIVERISTY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 47 
 
condominium building owned and operated by Destin Yacht Club.113 The 
ACP housed two restaurants operated by Legendary and abutted a marina 
that was operated and maintained by Destin.114 The ACP separated the 
marina from a nearby harbor.115 Destin held a lease to the submerged land 
within the marina that was conveyed by the condominium developer.116 
An operating agreement between Legendary and Destin granted 
Legendary “certain marina expansion right” in the submerged land.117 
When Legendary wanted to construct a commercial dock the Destin 
homeowner’s association tried to thwart the project.118 
Adopting a contract–based approach, the Legendary court limited its 
inquiry to four agreements that regulated each party’s right to use the 
disputed property: the condominium declaration, the ACP deed, an 
operating agreement between the parties, and an agreement that both 
governed Legendry’s use of the marina and assigned the developer’s 
submerged land lease to the association.119 Turning to the agreements, the 
court found the operating agreement expressly permitted Destin to expand 
the marina even if the association declined to join the expansion project.120 
Because the deed and condominium declaration were subject to the 
operating agreement, the court found that Destin could pursue the dock 
construction even if the association did not join the project.121 Thus, the 
operating agreement and the condominium declaration did grant Destin an 
enforceable right to use the marina to construct the dock. 
Legendary establishes two key principles the Sterling court relied on 
to preserve the commercial owner’s ownership rights in that case: (1) 
property rights in property that abuts condominium property can be held 
by non–condominium owners and (2) Florida courts will look to 
agreements as well as the condominium declaration itself to determine the 
rights each party has in a disputed property. Notably, the contract–based 
approach allowed the court to resolve the dispute without turning to the 
FCA despite the condominium declaration being among the instruments 
the court examined. However, Sterling shows the Legendary court’s 
contract–based approach to property rights disputes between 
condominium and non–condominium owners can be used to resolve 
disputes that do implicate the FCA’s provisions. While Legendary 
 






119 Id. at 625. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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concerns riparian rather than airspace rights, the decision shows that 
Florida courts defer to contracts when establishing ownership rights in 
disputes between condominium and non–condominium owners. 
Moreover, the decision shows that Florida courts limit the scope of 
property right inquiries to the agreements spelling out each owner’s right 
to use the disputed property.122 
ii. Florida Courts Have Found That Certain Property Rights Do 
Exist In Airspace 
Ervin and Claughton Hotels show that landowners have the right to 
use and exclude others from airspace above their land.123 Moreover, these 
cases show that Florida common law has recognizes at least some property 
rights in airspace that can be separated from surface ownership.124 While 
the Sterling court limited its analysis to the FCA’s and did not have to turn 
to common law principles, these two cases show that Florida common law 
recognizes ownership of airspace when that airspace is not part of a 
condominium. 
In State ex rel. Ervin v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, the Florida 
Supreme Court found that a fee simple owner has a sufficient property 
interest in the airspace adjoining her land to require a municipal agency to 
take an easement to use that airspace.125 The dispute arose after the 
Jacksonville Expressway Authority (JEA) adopted a resolution to 
condemn an easement in airspace over Ervin’s property.126 The Florida 
Attorney General filed an information in quo warranto so the court could 
determine if the agency had the power to condemn airspace easements.127 
A realtor who challenged the resolution argued the statute authorizing the 
taking of an easement “requires [JEA] to acquire all property in fee 
simple” as opposed to severing an interest in airspace from the underlying 
land.128 The statute creating the JEA permitted the agency to “acquire, 
purchase, hold, lease as lessee and use any franchise, property, real, 
personal or mixed, tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, necessary 
 
122 Id. at 624 (finding that the lower court was in error when it admitted extrinsic 
evidence). 
123 See State ex rel. Ervin v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 139 So. 2d 135, 138–39 
(Fla. 1962); See City of Miami v. Claughton Hotels, Inc., 157 So. 2d 196, 198 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1963). 
124 See Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 138–139 (finding that an easement in airspace could be 
condemned by a municipal authority); See Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 (finding the city 
did not owe taxes for a portion of airspace above an easement it owned that was exclusively 
occupied by a hotel building). 
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or desirable for carrying out the purposes of the authority”129 including 
“the power to acquire rights of ‘access, air, view, and light.’”130 
The court found that the statute’s stipulation that JEA acquire fee 
simple, was “obviously intended to prescribe the requirement only in those 
situations where it is contemplated that the land itself, as distinguished 
from an appurtenance, is needed for the public use.”131 Instead, the court 
found that when the JEA finds it ‘necessary or desirable’ the agency can 
acquire “by condemnation or otherwise, easements and interests less than 
a fee, except in those instances where it is necessary to use the land 
itself.”132 However, the court found that under Florida law fee simple 
absolute “applies only to an estate in land itself, as distinguished from an 
appurtenance or easement of other incorporeal interest.”133 Although the 
JAE could not take a fee simple in the airspace, the agency could condemn 
“easements through the air in perpetuity” that would grant the agency the 
right to use the airspace “to accomplish the purposes authorized by the 
expressway statutes.”134 While Ervin does not affirm that fee simple 
ownership of airspace separate and apart from the underlying land was 
possible under Florida law prior to the Condominium Act, the court’s 
finding that a property interest in airspace can be separated from the 
underlying land provides a fundamental premise necessary to permit a fee 
simple absolute in airspace at common law. 
In a second airspace easement case, a Florida court found that the size 
of an easement is diminished when airspace above that easement is being 
exclusively used by another property owner.135 In City of Miami v. 
Claughton Hotels, the titular hotel granted the City an easement so that a 
public sidewalk could pass through the hotel’s property. 136 A multi–story 
portion of the hotel extended over the sidewalk, enclosing a portion of the 
airspace above the easement.137 When the City calculated its pro rata share 
of the property tax bill, it excluded the portion of airspace occupied by the 
hotel. 138 The Circuit Court found that City was still liable for the share of 
property taxes allocated to the occupied airspace.139 The City appealed on 
 
129 Id. (italics omitted). 




134 Id. at 138–39. 
135 Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 . 
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the grounds that the damages ordered by the Circuit Court did not properly 
account for the airspace above the sidewalk being used by the hotel. 140 
The appellate court began from the premise that “[t]he owner of a 
parcel of land is entitled to the control and use the space above it, and such 
use may be of material value.”141 The court found that a reduction to the 
City’s tax burden was appropriate because the hotel was still using the 
airspace above the first floor.142 Citing Tatum Bros Real Estate 
&Investment Co. v. Watson for the proposition that contract law governs 
property agreements. The Court found that, under the agreement, “i[t] City 
controls and dominates the material property as to its surface use, and the 
company dominates it by using it as a base for a portion of its building in 
the superadjacent air space.”143 Because the hotel retained exclusive use 
of that airspace, the burden of owning the airspace—in this case, a larger 
property tax bill that accounts for airspace being used by the hotel—were 
properly attributed to the hotel.144 While both the hotel and City “shared 
in the use of the ‘sidewalk’” and each owner had “a degree of domination” 
over the sidewalk, ownership of the sidewalk and adjoining airspace could 
be divided between the hotel and the City for the propose of assessing a 
property tax.145 
As in Ervin, Claughton Hotels did not address whether airspace can 
be owned in fee simple absolute. Because the airspace was appurtenant to 
terrestrial parcels—both the City’s sidewalk and the hotel structure—the 
Claughton Hotels court did not have to grapple with ownership of airspace 
separate and apart from underlying land or building. Although the 
Claughton Hotels court did not proscribe a method for delineating the 
boundaries between the portions of airspace allocated to each property, the 
decision did clarify that a property interest in airspace can (1) be severed 
from the underlying land and (2) be divided into distinct units that can be 
owned by separate owners. Moreover, Claughton Hotels extended the 
deference shown to written instruments by Tatum Bros. to airspace 
ownership.146 Following Tatum Bros., Claughton Hotels shows that a 
written agreement can be used to regulate airspace use between owners of 
neighboring real property. The hotel’s right to exclude the City from a 
portion of the airspace was not challenged. The only issue for the court to 
 
140 Id. at 198. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. (citing Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. Watson, 109 So. 623, 626 (1926)). 
144 Id. (finding that the hotel used a portion of the sidewalk because its building extended 
over adjacent airspace). 
145 Id. 
146 See id. (citing Tatum, 109 So. at 626 for the proposition that the benefits and burdens 
of ownership flows to the person with the legal right to dominate property). 
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decide was whether, under the terms of the agreement, the City’s pro rata 
share of the airspace only included the airspace not being exclusively used 
by the hotel. Finding that the City’s portion of airspace did not include 
airspace occupied by the hotel, the court recognized that airspace can be 
vertically divided among at least two owners. Although the City held an 
easement that included the airspace rather than an airspace fee simple, the 
decision suggests that Florida law could accommodate the vertical 
division of airspace among different owners prior to the Condominium 
Act’s passage.147 
While the FCA codified fee simple absolute in airspace, Florida law 
prior to the FCA’s passage did not foreclose the possibly of a fee simple 
in airspace. As Ervin and Claughton Hotels both show, Florida courts had 
found that at least some property rights did attach to airspace at common 
law. However, as Sterling shows, there remain lingering questions about 
whether airspace estates expressly excluded from a condominium can 
exist at common law. The Sterling decision shows how broadly Florida 
courts can interpret the Condominium Act’s scope to avoid ambiguities 
about common law airspace ownership and, in turn, uphold fee simple 
absolute in airspace that has been excluded from a condominium by an 
express provision in a declaration. 
IV. STERLING BREEZE OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC. V. NEW 
STERLING: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2008, declaration of a condominium was recorded for Sterling 
Breeze, a 22–story high–rise building located in Panama City Beach.148 
Sterling Breeze Condominium (the Association), a not–for–profit Florida 
corporation, was organized to operate and manage a condominium called 
Sterling Breeze Condominium located in Bay County, Florida.149 The 
building is a 22–story high–rise with 145 residential units, common 
elements, and four alternative commercial parcels (ACPs) on the ground 
floor.150 The ACPs accounted for 2.6% of all units in the building. 
Condominium property occupied “almost all of the airspace” in the 
building.151 The developer excluded four Associated Commercial 
Properties (ACPs) from the condominium, retaining title to the ACPs, and 
 
147 Id. (holding that, for tax purposes, the size of the City’s easement had to account for 
airspace that was exclusively occupied by the hotel). 
148 Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. New Sterling Resorts, LLC, 255 So. 3d 434, 
435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 436. 
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then conveyed title to all four ACPs to New Sterling.152 New Sterling 
managed a rental program that rented out units in the Sterling Breeze 
Condominium and managed rentals for 34 unit owners in the building.153 
The parcels were occupied by a wine bar, a gym, a commercial laundry 
facility, offices used for rental management and real estate sales, and a 
storage area for luggage carts.154 The ACPs were described in the 
declaration and the association and developers also reached an easement 
agreement.155 The four ACPs were assigned to New Sterling Resorts after 
the deceleration was executed.156 New Sterling also entered an easement 
and reservation agreement with the association that provided for the ACPs 
to be used for commercial purposes and for New Sterling to pay for a share 
of common expenses like utilities and building maintenance.157 The 
declaration permitted the ACPs to be conveyed in fee simple and also 
provided that the condominium’s restrictions and covenants would not 
apply to the excluded parcels.158 In August 2014, the Association brought 
a lawsuit seeking to nullify the developer’s reservation of the four ACPs 
in the declaration and to have ownership of the ACPs transferred to the 
Association to be owned as common elements of the condominium.159 
With respect to fee simple airspace ownership, the association sought 
a declaration that the ACPs were not recognized as fee simples under 
Florida law and, therefore, the ACPs were common elements of the 
condominium.160 The Association sought a decree quieting title of the four 
ACPs in its favor and sought a declaratory judgement to establish its rights 
and ownership interest in the ACPs along with damages.161 The 
Association argued that ACPs could not be owned in “fee simple apart 
from the condominium” under the FCA because the parcels had been 
expressly excluded from the condominium or under Florida law.162The 
Association also pursued an unjust enrichment claim to recover rent, 
condominium assessments, and unity costs associated with the ACPs.163 
 
152 Plaintiff’s Pretrial Legal Memorandum at *1, Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. 
New Sterling, LLC, 2016 WL 11698796 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016). 
153 Defendant’s Written Closing Argument at *2, Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. 
New Sterling Resorts, LLC, 2016 WL 11698796 (Fla. Cir. Ct. January 13, 2017). 
154 Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 436. 
155 Id. at 436. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 435. 
159 Id.at 436. 
160 Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. New Sterling Resorts, LLC, , 2014 WL 
12930265, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2014). 
161 Id. at *1–*2 
162 Sterling, 2016 WL 11698796 at *1. 
163 Id. 
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Looking to the FCA, the Circuit Court found that “land within a 
condominium can be any combination of airspace, surface space, and 
subterranean space.”164 Moreover, “the statute contemplates that airspace 
may be excluded while surface space is included” in a parcel.165 The 
Circuit Court approvingly cited Splash Owners’ Association, Inc. v. New 
Sterling Resorts, which explained that the ad coelum doctrine had given 
way to the view that a “landowner is generally held to own only the amount 
of space he can reasonably use.”166 Finally, the Circuit Court found that 
“[e]ven if the FCA is inapplicable, the Court [found] no authority 
prohibiting ownership in fee simple of airspace” under Florida law.167The 
Circuit Court held that the developer “validly excluded [the ACPs] from 
the condominium form of ownership” and had transferred fee simple title 
in the ACPs to New Sterling Resorts. After a bench trial, the court found 
in favor of the Association on the unjust enrichment claim.168 Both parties 
appealed. 
V.  APPELLATE COURT FINDS FLORIDA CONDOMINIUM ACT APPLIES 
TO AIRSPACE PARCELS IN CONDOMINIUM BUILDINGS THAT ARE 
EXCLUDED FROM CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP 
The Court of Appeals rejected the Association’s challenge to New 
Sterling’s ownership of the ACPs and found that airspace parcels excluded 
from condominium ownership and located in a condominium building 
continue to benefit from the FCA’s provisions permitting fee simple 
absolute in airspace.169 Although the four ACPs were located on the 
building’s ground floor, the FCA applied to these units because all parcels 
inside a condominium building that are described in a declaration are 
considered land that is, in turn, governed by the FCA.170 Instead, the court 
 
164 Id. (discussing the definition of land provided by FLA. STAT. § 718.103(18) (2020)). 
165 Id. at *2. 
166 Id. at *2 (citing Splash Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. New Sterling Resorts, LLC et al., No. 
09–5231 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. 2012) (discussing the Court’s finding in United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) that land ownership does include an amount of airspace 
adjoining a terrestrial plot but noting this vertical extension must have an upper boundary 
to accommodate other airspace uses like flying airplanes)). 
167 Id. at *1. 
168 Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. New Sterling, LLC, 255 So. 3d 434, 
435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). 
169 Id. at 437 (finding that “Florida law does not require divestment of the ACPs from 
New Sterling Resorts.”). 
170 See FLA. STAT. § 718.103(18) (2021) (providing that, for the purposes of the Florida 
Condominium Act, land “means the surface of a legally described parcel of real property 
and includes, unless otherwise specified in the declaration and whether separate from or 
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found that the definitions of condominium property and land provided by 
the statute do not “require[] that all of the airspace [in a building] be 
include within the condominium ownership.”171 The court found that the 
FCA “contemplates that portions of airspace may be included or excluded” 
from the condominium form of ownership.172 Therefore, the declaration 
can subject “most (but not all) of the airspace to condominium 
ownership  . . .  under the statute.”173 The inclusion of the ACPs in the 
declaration was sufficient to keep the parcels within the FCA’s scope.174 
Because the ACPs remained within the FCA’s scope the parcels could 
benefit from both the FCA’s airspace–inclusive definition of land.175 In 
turn, because the ACPs qualified as land under the statute, the parcels 
could be held in fee simple absolute as real property.176 
The court found that the declaration complied with the FCA’s 
requirements and the disputed parcels were properly identified and 
reserved for “ownership separate from the condominium.”177 Moreover, 
the Association had signed an easement agreement attached to the 
deceleration acknowledging the parcels were being reserved for the 
developer to be used as commercial spaces.178 Because the “disputed 
airspace  . . . was identified and reserved via a declaration of condominium 
and associated agreement recorded [under the statute]” the ACPs remained 
within the FCA’s scope. Thus, although the ACPs were excluded from the 
condominium, the parcels continued to benefit from the statute’s 
codification of airspace fee simple because the parcels were described in 
the declaration.179 Because the ACPs remained land for the purposes of the 
Condominium Act, the court turned to the statute rather than common law 
property doctrine to resolve the ownership dispute.180  The appellate court 
 
including such surface, airspace lying above and subterranean space lying below such 
surface.”). 
171 Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 437. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 See id. at 436. 
175 Id. at 436–437 (citing Fla. Stat. § 718.103(18) (2020) which defines land as “the 
surface of a legally described parcel of real property [that] includes [airspace]” for the 
purposes of the FCA.). 
176 Id. at 437 (finding that Florida law did not “require divestment of the ACPs from New 
Sterling Resorts.”). 
177 Id. at 436. 
178 See id. (finding that “irrespective of how the common law might have addressed 
separate owners of surface space and airspace, the disputed airspace in this case was 
identified and reserved via a declaration of condominium and associated agreement 
recorded under chapter 718, Florida Statutes, which specifically addresses 
airspace   . . . . Resolution here thus depends on the statute.”) (citation omitted). 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
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affirmed the trial court’s statutory interpretation and upheld the grant of 
summary judgement on the declaratory and quiet title claims.181 With 
respects to the unjust enrichment claim, the court found the Association 
could not pursue an unjust enrichment claim as a matter of law because 
the easement and reservation agreement that provided for utility and other 
expenses was an express contract that concerned the same subject matter 
as the quasi–contract, unjust enrichment claim.182 
VI. ONCE “LAND,” ALWAYS “LAND”: WHERE DOES STERLING 
LEAVE CONDOMINIUM AIRSPACE OWNERSHIP IN FLORIDA? 
Sterling addresses three concerns about how Florida courts might 
apply the FCAto airspace ownership disputes. First, the decision 
underscores the deference Florida courts give to written agreements when 
deciding ownership disputes involving condominium property.183 Second, 
Sterling clarifies that any airspace parcel described in a condominium 
declaration will likely benefit from the FCA’s codification of airspace fee 
simple184. Finally, Sterling suggests the potential outer limits of the FCA’s 
scope more generally by affirming that an airspace parcel expressly 
excluded from a condominium is still subject to the at least some of the 
FCA’s provisions.185 This broad scope allowed the Sterling court to protect 
the ACP fees from the uncertain status of airspace ownership under Florida 
common law.186 If the ACPs were not subject to the FCA, courts would 
have to look to the common law to determine ownership of these parcels. 
Although researchers and courts have noted that airspace ownership was 
possible at common law,187 Florida courts have only considered a small 
number of non–condominium airspace disputes as discussed earlier in this 
note. Permitting non–condominium units located in condominium 
 
181 Id. at 437. 
182 Id. 
183 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (finding that the declaration, and therefore the FCA, controlled 
the dispute and not “common law property principles.”). 
184 Id. (holding that, because the non–condominium airspace parcels were described in a 
declaration, those parcels would continue to benefit from FCA provisions permitting fee 
simple absolute ownership of airspace despite the parcels being expressly excluded from 
the resulting condominium via the declaration). 
185 Id. (finding that non–condominium airspace parcels described in a declaration 
continued to benefit from a provision in the FCA permitting airspace to be owned in fee 
simple absolute). 
186 Id. at 436 (finding that, because the disputed property was “identified and recorded” 
in a declaration the FCA and not “common law property principles” controlled the dispute). 
187 See Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 641 (explaining that “[o]ne could 
construct a fee interest in airspace” at common law); See Davis, supra note 66, at 76 
(noting that “a common–law condominium was always theoretically possible”). 
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buildings, like the excluded parcels at dispute in Sterling, to come within 
the scope of the FCA ensures these parcels can be owned in fee simple. 
Although Ervin and Claughton Hotels shows that Florida courts recognize 
some property interests in airspace, permitting the FCA to reach excluded 
parcels avoids subjecting these parcels to the uncertain status of fee simple 
airspace ownership at common law. However, had the excluded parcels 
not fallen within the FCA’s scope, the contract–based approach to 
ownership adopted by the Legendary court and the recognition of limited 
airspace property interests in Ervin and Claughton Hotels support 
upholding an airspace fee simple under Florida common law that would 
permit the buying and selling of airspace parcels located in vertical 
developments like condominium buildings but that are not subject to 
condominium ownership. 
A. Sterling Underscores Florida Court Preference For Regulation 
of Airspace Use In Mixed–Use Condominium Projects Through 
Contracts 
In keeping with the contracts–based approach to condominium 
disputes adopted in Legendary, Sterling signals that Florida courts turn to 
the express terms of private agreements to regulate relationships between 
non–condominium owners—i.e. owners like Sterling who own units in a 
condominium building that have been excluded from condominium 
ownership—and condominium owners in a mixed–use building.188 Like 
Legendary, Sterling underscores that the FCA grants condominium and 
independent airspace owners a great deal of flexibility to privately regulate 
the rights and burdens imposed on each owner.189 In Legendary, use of the 
shared riparian property was regulated by a declaration coupled with other 
agreements. In that case, it was the operating agreement rather than the 
declaration that furnished the dispositive provision establishing the 
 
188 See Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 625 (finding that a dispute concerning certain riparian 
rights between a marina operator and a condominium owners’ association had to be 
resolved by looking to the terms of four agreements made between the association and the 
marina operator); 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (looking to the declaration and a fee–sharing 
agreement reached between the non–commercial airspace owner and the condominium 
owners’ association to resolve both an ownership dispute and a dispute concerning fee–
sharing for expenses such as utility costs and security attributable to the building as a 
whole). 
189 See Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 625 (finding that the declaration and written agreements 
controlled a riparian rights dispute); 255 So. 3d at 437 (finding that a the condominium 
owners’ association could not pursue a quasi–contract claim for disputed shared building 
maintenance and utility fees because a quasi–contract claim “cannot be pursue[d]  . . .  if 
an express contract exists concerning the same subject matter.”) (quoting Diamond “S” 
Dev. Corp. v. Mercantile Bank, 989 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). 
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commercial owner’s right to use the riparian property.190 Sterling shows 
that the condominium declaration can be used to grant an independent 
airspace owner an enforceable right to use property that adjoins 
condominium property.191 Under Sterling, using a declaration to regulate 
ownership and use of airspace between condominium and independent 
owners has the added benefit of ensuring that the FCA’s protections are 
available to all airspace parcels described in the declaration. 
There are two obvious benefits to the contract–based approach taken 
in Sterling. First, this approach to property rights serves a protective 
function by deterring ownership challenges in vertical developers mounted 
by a dominant group of owners. In both Legendary and Sterling, Florida 
courts upheld the property rights conferred to non–condominium owners 
when those property interests were challenged by an association of 
owners192. Sterling shows that Florida courts will protect airspace owners 
from attempts by condominium associations to informally alter the 
burdens and benefits conferred by a condominium declaration to a given 
owner. Moreover, the contract–based approach taken in both Legendary 
and Sterling, show that Florida courts will limit ownership inquiries to the 
relevant governing documents and the statutory provisions animating 
those agreements.193 
Ultimately, the Sterling court relied on the FCA’s contract–based 
ownership regime because the ACPs were found to be within the FCA’s 
reach.194 However, as Legendary shows, upholding the right to use an 
airspace parcel granted to an ACP owner by a (1) condominium 
declaration and (2) by a conveyance of the parcels to the owner from the 
 
190 Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 625. 
191 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (holding that the owner of four non–condominium airspace 
parcels, who was also not a member of the condominium owners’ association, did own 
those parcels in fee simple absolute because the parcels were created via a declaration and, 
thus, continued to benefit from the FCA’s provision permitting fee simple absolute 
ownership of airspace.) 
192 Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 625 (holding that specific wharfing rights reserved via a 
written agreement in favor of a marina operator were not trumped by other wharfing rights 
conferred to the condominium owners’ association); 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (holding that 
the owner of non–condominium airspace parcels did own those parcels in fee simple 
absolute and, therefore, the condominium owners’ association could not claim title to those 
parcels). 
193 See Legendary, 724 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (finding the trial court’s 
admission of extrinsic evidence was improper because the governing documents alone 
were relevant to the dispute); See Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 436 (finding that, because a 
statutorily compliment declaration existed, common law property doctrines would not 
determine ownership of the excluded ACPs). 
194 255 So. 3d at 436 (finding that, because the non–condominium airspace parcels were 
“identified and recorded” in a declaration the property was governed by the FCA and not 
“common law property principles.”). 
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developer result could permit a Florida court to uphold the ACP owner’s 
fee simple without reference to the FCA. However, because Florida 
common law has only recognized limited property rights in airspace, 
creating, excluding, and conveying airspace parcels that will adjoin 
condominium property should be carried out via declaration to ensure the 
parcels benefit from Sterling’s extension of the FCA’s provision to 
excluded parcels. 
Sterling clarifies that the FCA’s provisions are available to a larger 
pool of owners than only condominium owners or owners of residential 
units.195 In turn, the decision signals to investors and commercial unit 
owners that Florida courts recognize the FCA can accommodate new 
preferences for organizing vertical developments. Sterling enhances the 
marketability of these parcels by assuring developers and prospective 
owners that potential common law limits on airspace ownership will not 
divest them of otherwise lawfully obtained real property. Permitting non–
condominium airspace ownership offers developers another tool to 
maximize occupancy in vertical developments and entice buyers who 
otherwise would shy away from condominium ownership because of 
associated fees or a desire for more autonomy than co–ownership might 
allow. Moreover, as both Sterling and Legendary show, associations and 
developers can use written agreements appended to a declaration to either 
require non–condominium parcels to contribute general upkeep and 
maintenance fees or the association can exempt non–condominium parcels 
from those fees.196 Ultimately, Sterling not only clarifies that any airspace 
parcel included in a declaration will benefit from the FCA’s provisions, 
the decision also shows the high degree of flexibility offered by 
declarations under the FCA. 
B. Sterling Breeze Shows That Non–Condominium Air Space 
Parcels Located In Condominium Buildings Benefit From The 
FCA’s Codification of Fee Simple Ownership of Airspace 
Sterling makes it clear that a non–condominium parcel can benefit 
from the FCA’s codification of fee simple absolute ownership of airspace 
even if that parcel was described in the declaration only so that it could 
 
195 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (holding that an owner who is not affiliated with a condominium 
owners’ association was able to own airspace located in a majority–condominium 
building). 
196 See Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 437 (noting that the ACP agreement that was appended to 
the condominium declaration “obligated the owner of the ACPs” to pay for “all 
expenses” for services and utilities connected to the ACPs See Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 
625 (noting the marina agreement attached to the condominium declaration provided for 
the condominium association to be “responsible for maintenance and operation of the 
marina in accordance with the marina agreement.”). 
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excluded from the resulting condominium.197 Because fee simple 
ownership of airspace is not well settled under Florida law, the application 
of the FCA to non–condominium airspace parcels in Sterling provides 
developers, owners, and associations with clearer guidance on how to use 
declarations and appended agreements to create different types of airspace 
parcels inside of the same building. 
Under Sterling, the procedure used to create the airspace parcel is the 
dispositive factor that permitted the excluded parcel to benefit from the 
FCA’s provisions.198 Sterling found the FCA’s silence on whether “all of 
the airspace” in a condominium building must be “included within 
condominium ownership” shows the FCA “contemplates that portions of 
airspace may be included or excluded” from a condominium.199 Sterling 
suggests that once an airspace parcel has been created pursuant to the FCA 
is irrevocably transformed into real property that can be held in fee 
simple.200 Given the permanence of this transformation, Florida courts will 
rarely have to look outside the FCA when deciding ownership disputes 
concern parcels within a condominium building. Neither the location of 
the parcels nor the uses to which the parcels were put factored into the 
court’s analysis. Under Sterling, courts will only have to turn to the 
declaration to determine if an airspace parcel was properly described in 
that instrument and, therefore, is governed by the FCA. 
With respect to mixed–use condominiums specifically, the Sterling 
decision shows that Florida courts will likely extend the FCA’s airspace 
ownership provision to commercial units that are adjacent to 
condominium units and common elements even when those commercial 
units are not a part of the condominium. In Sterling, the trial and appellate 
courts affirmed that the FCA’s benefits do extend to commercial parcels 
located inside of a condominium–dominated building. 201Again, the 
process used to create the parcels was the most relevant factor to determine 
whether the parcels were subject to the FCA.202 
However, as new airspace uses emerge, it is not clear under Sterling 
which owners would own the rights to airspace that was not described in 
 
197 See Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 437 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 718.103 (2020) and other 
provisions of the Florida Condominium Act). 
198 255 So. 3d at 436 (finding that, because non–condominium airspace parcels were 
“identified and recorded” in a declaration that complied with the FCA the FCA, and not 
common law property principles, governed the parcels). 
199 Id. 
200 See id. at 436 (describing the Florida Condominium Act’s airspace–inclusive 
definition of land). 
201 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (finding that, because the commercial parcels were described in 
a declaration, the units were governed by the FCA despite the units being neither 
condominium units nor common elements). 
202 See Id. 
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the condominium and for which there is no other operating or ownership 
agreement that would permit a contract–based analysis in line with 
Legendary. Undescribed airspace would likely include airspace that abuts 
the exterior of the building, for example airspace over a rooftop or a 
structure constructed on a rooftop after the declaration has been filed, and 
that could be but is not currently being used. Sterling suggests the FCA 
governs any airspace parcel described in an enforceable declaration. 203 
This requirement will likely always be met when the disputed airspace is 
located within a building. When airspace parcels are located within a 
building, those parcels must either be expressly described or the parcels 
may be implicitly described when the condominium parcels, common 
elements, and excluded parcels are delineated. However, it is not clear if 
the FCA will also reach exterior airspace that may have escaped attention 
when the interior parcels were being described. Given the well–settled 
principle established in Casuby that a landowner has a property interest in 
airspace adjoin her parcel, an ownership dispute concerning undescribed, 
exterior airspace would likely result in one party being granted at least 
some property interests in that airspace.204 Sterling applies this principle 
to the interior of condominium buildings by rejecting the association’s 
claim that its ownership extended vertically from the building’s 
foundation and was only interrupted by the condominium units.205 
As Ervin and Claughton Hotels demonstrate, Florida courts also 
recognize that a property interest in airspace flows to the owner of the 
adjoining land.206 However, Ervin, Claughton Hotels, and Sterling do not 
resolve whether an individual unit owner, a condominium association, a 
developer, or a government entity would hold title to undescribed exterior 
airspace. Moreover, Sterling only clarifies that the FCA governs airspace 
parcels that are (1) located in a building’s interior and (2) are described in 
 
203 255 So. 3d at 436 (finding that the FCA governed non–condominium commercial 
parcels because those parcels were described in a declaration). 
204 See 328 U.S. at 264 (finding that, in a dispute concerning airspace use over a 
residential parcel between a private landowner and the U.S. government, the “landowner 
owns at least as much of the space above the ground as the [sic] can occupy or use in 
connection with the land” and the fact that the landowner “does not occupy [that airspace] 
in a physical sense  . . .  is not material.”) 
205 See Initial Brief of Appellant/Cross–Appellee at 17, Sterling Breeze Owners Ass’n v. 
New Sterling Resorts, LLC 255 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (No. 1D17–1553), 2017 
WL 4438686, at *1 (arguing that the definition of land under the Florida Condominium 
Act “is intended to be limited in scope to condominiums and the airspace contained within 
them and not to property explicitly excluded from the condominium form of ownership by 
the terms of the declaration itself.”). 
206 139 So. 2d at 139 (finding that the Florida Legislature intended to provide a property 
owner with “full compensation for any property” including an airspace easement “taken 
for the public use.”); Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 (holding that the “owner of a parcel of 
land is entitled to the control and use the space above it”). 
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a declaration. It remains unclear if undescribed airspace that is adjacent to 
a condominium building but located outside of the building (for example, 
airspace above a rooftop) would be part of the condominium’s common 
elements. If all parcels in a building are owned by either a condominium 
association or condominium owners, it seems clear cut that the adjacent 
airspace above the building would constitute a common element because, 
under the FCA, common elements include any portion of condominium 
property that is not assigned to a unit.207 However, in cases like Sterling 
where a condominium shares the same building as non–condominium 
parcels, neither the FCA nor case law provides a clear answer about how 
to assign ownership of undescribed, exterior airspace.208 In these mixed–
ownership cases, the broad freedom of contract granted to developers and 
associations by the FCA provides the most obvious solution to potential 
airspace ownership disputes. Given that Florida courts will enforce 
declarations that include elements not specially addressed in the FCA—
for example, the creation of ground–floor, non–condominium commercial 
parcels in Sterling—developers and associations should consider 
addressing exterior airspace in governing documents so that airspace can 
be productively, and perhaps profitably, used in the future.209 
To encourage airspace use, more clarity is needed on who owns non–
condominium airspace that adjoins a condominium building and, 
therefore, who can and cannot use and convey interests in that airspace. 
For example, who would be able to sell easements permitting third parties 
to use airspace directly above a condominium building? Surely, use of 
adjoining airspace as a right–of–way from drones or to host vertical 
farming equipment210 would generate income for developers or 
associations while reducing land use by consolidating multiple uses onto 
a single parcel. Under Federal Aviation Authority rules, drones can fly up 
to 400 feet above the ground or, if the drone is flying near structures, no 
 
207 See FLA. STAT. § 718.103(8) (2021) (defining common elements as “the portions of 
the condominium property not included in the units”). 
208 255 So. 3d at 437 (observing that “neither the definition of “condominium property,” 
nor “land” [as provided by the FCA requires that all of the airspace be included within 
condominium owners” and that “the statute contemplates that portions of airspace may be 
included or excluded” from a condominium via a declaration). 
209 See Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 437 (noting that the FCA “contemplates that portions of 
airspace may be included or excluded” as a general matter but finding no specific section 
that addresses non–condominium commercial parcels). 
210 See Nathalie N. Prescott, Agroterrorism, Resilience, and Indoor Farming, 23 ANIMAL 
L. 103, 107 (2016) (explaining that vertical farming uses hydroponic, aquaponic, or 
aeroponic equipment to grow crops in vertical layers instead of horizontal rows and noting 
that vertical farms are extremely efficient and productive, with some vertical farms being 
able to achieve the same yield as a conventional farm while using less than 1% of the square 
feet required for a conventional farm.). 
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more than 400 feet above a structure’s highest point.211 While the Federal 
Aviation Authority clearly has authority over airspace that is 1,000 feet 
above the tallest obstacle in high–congestion areas, 500 feet above ground 
level in uncongested areas, and landing and takeoff pathways, it remains 
unclear whether the FAA’s authority reaches below those thresholds.212 
Because airspace ownership that is below the FAA threshold and adjacent 
to real property is a state–level property rights issue, states have been able 
to grant causes of action for airspace trespass by drones or interferences 
with airspace use in general.213 In Florida, the state is responsible for drone 
regulation when federal regulations, authorizations, or exemptions do not 
apply.214 Given the broad freedom of contract available to developers and 
owners under the FCA and the applicability of the FCA to non–
condominium airspace parcels described in a declaration, creating, 
conveying, and monetizing airspace parcels above condominium buildings 
could present either developers or associations with new sources of 
revenue while promoting the adoption of new technologies like drones. 
Vertical developments like high–rise condominiums can also help 
growing cities accommodate growing demand for housing and 
commercial spaces in urban centers while easing land scarcity.215 
Historically, vertical developments have been the go–to planning tool in 
cities, like New York, where developers and residents face high land costs 
and land scarcity.216 With metropolitan areas across the United States 
growing at a far faster pace than rural areas, vertical developments can 
help meet to meet demand for both housing and commercial space in high–
growth areas.217 In turn, concentrating residential uses near commercial in 
 
211 14 C.F.R. §107.51 (2016). 
212 See Robert A. Heverly, The State of Drones: State Authority to Regulate Drones, 
8 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 29, 38 (2015). 
213 See id. at 53–55 (noting that statutes passed in Georgia and Minnesota that grant 
landowners causes of action for interference with the use of airspace above their land and 
noting an Oregon law that “that specifically provides landowners and land possessors with 
a legal cause of action if an operator flies a drone over their properties at a height of less 
than 400 feet after having done so at least once before and after having been notified by 
the owner not to do so again”). 
214 FLA. STAT. § 330.41(3)(a) (2021). 
215 See MIR ALI & AJLA AKSAMIJA, TOWARDS A BETTER URBAN LIFE: INTEGRATION OF 
CITIES AND TALL BUILDINGS, in 4th Architectural Conference on High Rise Buildings 
(Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat) 1, 2 (2008). 
216 See id. at 1. 
217 See Matthew Brown, Takeaways from the US census: A slower growing but more 
multiracial society, as cities outpace rural areas, USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2021, 6:39 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/08/12/takeaways–2020–
census–rural–urban–population–divides/5493030001/ (explaining that U.S. census data 
shows that U.S. metropolitan areas saw an average growth rate of 9% over the last ten years 
while non–metropolitan areas grew by only 1%.). 
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urban areas can help reduce the overall carbon footprint of a population–
center by reducing the need for energy–intensive commutes.218 Moreover, 
vertical development can help preserve arable land in areas where arable 
land is already scarce by constraining the growth of suburban 
developments.219 In areas with both high population and economic growth, 
vertical developments like mixed–use high rises offer practical solutions 
to expand housing stock near commercial hubs and support economic 
development by providing more commercial space.220 For example, 
mixed–use, high–rise towers have proven popular in Dubai to 
accommodate rapid economic expansion.221 In turn, this consolidation 
frees up more space for residential, commercial, and recreational use in 
high–demand areas while potentially making each parcel more 
economically productive by allowing developers and owners to market 
units to a broader array of users. 
Florida, in particular, has seen a surge of new interests from 
prospective residents and from business alike since the start of the 
COVID–19 pandemic and is now one of the top destinations for 
relocations in the country.222 Demand for condominiums and townhomes 
was especially robust in 2021, with second–quarter 2021 sales in that 
category growing 117% year–over–year.223 To meet this demand, 
developers have embraced mixed–use, high–rise buildings that host 
conventional condominium units as well as luxury amenities like spas and 
restaurants.224 Under Sterling, fee simple ownership of airspace in a 
 
218 See ALI & AKSAMIJA, supra note 193, at 3; cf. id. at 15–16 (noting that Jakarta has 
faced “increased transportation problems and congestion” as high–rise buildings became 
“widely used for commercial and residential functions  . . .  to address the issues of land 
scarcity and enormous population  . . . .”). 
219 See ALI & AKSAMIJA, supra note 193, at 2–3. 
220 See generally id. at 15 (noting that high–rise buildings in Jakarta help mitigate land 
scarcity issues while supporting three of the area’s primary sources of economic growth). 
221 See id. at 16. 
222 See Almost 330,000 people have moved to Florida during the past year; migration is 
expected to continue through 2025, ISLANDER NEWS  (May 21, 2021), https:// 
www.islandernews.com/lifestyle/homes/almost–330–000–people–have–moved–to–
florida–during–the–past–year–migration–is–expected/article_78860b40–aa7d–11eb–
957d–1f0232e9d6d0.html (noting that several surveys showed Florida was a top 
destination for people looking to relocate in 2020); See also Trevor Wheelwright, State of 
Moving in 2020: Moving Stats and the Impact of COVID–19, MOVE.ORG (June 22, 2021), 
https://www.move.org/2020–moving–stats–and–
trends/#TopStatesWherePeopleMovedtoandFrom (noting that Florida was the most 
moved–to state in 2020). 
223 Fla.’s Housing Market Continues Positive Trends Through 2Q, FLA. REALTORS (Aug. 
12, 2021), https://  www. floridarealtors.org/news–media/news–articles/2021/08/flas–
housing–market–continues–positive–trends–through–2q. 
224 See generally Nicole Lopez–Alvar, The tallest residential building south of New York 
City is coming to Miami, LOCAL 10  (Mar. 29, 2021, 4:41 PM), https:// www. 
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condominium building is available to seemingly for any type of use as long 
as that unit is described in the condominium declaration.225 Given the 
benefits of consolidating multiple uses into a single parcel, Sterling 
provides opportunity for developers and prospective owners to consider 
mixed–ownership approaches that are more responsive to local needs 
without having to give up the benefits of fee simple airspace ownership 
available under the FCA.226 
As Sterling shows, Florida law provides developers and associations 
with a broad freedom of contract that permits unique ownership 
arrangements as long as the declaration and appended agreements creating 
those arrangements comply with the FCA’s requirements that parcels be 
particularly described.227 However, while this flexibility permits novel 
arrangements that can maximize occupancy in a vertical development, 
both developers and associations will have to pay close attention to the 
rights they gain and relinquish when entering these arrangements. As both 
Legendary and Sterling shows, Florida courts prefer to resolve disputes 
between associations and non–condominium parcel owners by turning to 
declarations and related agreements formed under the FCA.228 Thus, 
Sterling should serve as a warning to owners and associations alike that, 
once ownership rights are created via a declaration, Florida courts will be 
reluctant look outside the four corners of that document if an owner’s title 
is challenged. 
While ambiguity about airspace property rights may slow the adoption 
of airspace uses like vertical farming and drone transportation, this 
uncertainty also provides an opportunity for developers, owners, and 
potential airspace users to steer public policy towards a flexible, contract–
based approach to owning and conveying property interests in airspace 




225 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (holding that a commercial operator that owned non–
condominium parcels and that did not belong to the condominium owners’ association was 
still able to own the parcels in fee simple absolute under the FCA). 
226 Id. (finding that a commercial owner that was not a member of a condominium 
owners’ association can still own airspace parcels in fee simple absolute when those parcels 
are located in a majority–condominium building). 
227 See Sterling Breeze Owners’ Ass’n v. New Sterling Resorts, LLC, 255 So. 3d 434, 
436 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). 
228 Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 624–25 (looking to the declaration and agreements 
referenced in the declaration to resolve a wharfing rights dispute between a marina operator 
and a condominium owners’ association); 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (holding that, because 
non–condominium airspace parcels were described in the declaration the FCA controlled 
a property dispute between the commercial owner and the condominium owners’ 
association and finding that a related fee–sharing agreement between the commercial 
owner and the condominium owners’ association governed a dispute over those fees). 
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Although condominiums continue to be a popular ownership structure for 
both purely residential and mixed–used vertical developments in Florida, 
developers and owners will find that novel uses for airspace require 
Florida courts and the legislature to further delineate (1) whether there are 
non–condominium airspace parcels created under Florida law which are 
not subject to the FCA’s provisions and (2) what, if any, protections does 
Florida law offer the owners and users of non–condominium airspace. 
While technologies like vertical farming equipment, drones, and flying 
vehicles were once the stuff of science–fiction stories, rapid development 
in all three of those spaces will undoubtedly have developers looking 
skyward to unlock value from the airspace above buildings.229 As these 
airspace uses become more common, assigning ownership of adjacent 
airspace via a declaration or an agreement appended to a declaration 
should be considered to ensure that the benefits and burdens of new 
airspace uses flow to the correct owners. 
VII. FLORIDA COMMON LAW WOULD PROVIDE THE STERLING 
COURT WITH ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS TO UPHOLD FEE SIMPLE IN 
THE EXCLUDED AIRSPACE PARCELS 
Even if the excluded parcels had not come within the FCA’s reach, 
Florida law would still offer courts the opportunity to find that airspace 
can be owned in fee simple absolute. First, the contract–based approach 
adopted in and Legendary shows that Florida courts will defer to 
agreements conveying the right to use property that is adjacent to 
condominium property.230 Second, both Ervin and Claughton Hotels 
establish that a property interest in adjoining airspace does flow to the 
owner of the underlying land231. Finally, Ervin and Claughton show that 
an interest in airspace that adjoins real property can be severed and 
conveyed to a separate owner.232 While Florida law has not expressly 
 
229 See generally Paul Lienert & Ben Klayman, Look, up in the sky—
it’s a flying Cadillac! GM unveils futuristic vehicle, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2021, 
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/look-up-sky-its-flying-cadillac-
gm-unveils-futuristic-vehicle-2021-01-12/ (describing a driverless flying taxicab that is 
being developed by General Motors). 
230 Legendary, 724 So. 2d at 625 (finding that a written agreement between a marina 
operator and a condominium owners’ association that was referenced in a declaration 
controlled a wharfing rights dispute between the parties). 
231 Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198; 139 So. 2d at 139 (finding that a highway authority 
would have to pay a property owner “full compensation” for an easement in airspace 
condemned over the property owners’ land). 
232 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 138–39 (permitting a highway authority to condemn an airspace 
easement over private land); Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 (finding that a hotel was only 
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recognized fee absolute ownership of airspace, cases upholding airspace 
easements lay the groundwork for recognizing these fees common law.233 
In Sterling, neither party contended that the declaration was 
defective.234 Instead, the association’s challenge rested on ambiguity about 
whether airspace can be owned in fee simple absolute under Florida 
common law.235 While Florida courts had not expressly permitted fee 
simple in airspace prior to the FCA’s passage, the contract–based approach 
to ownership taken in Tatum Bros. and adopted by the Legendary court 
would permit a court to uphold New Sterling’s fee simple in the ACPs236. 
Under the FCA, a declaration and all appended agreements are treated “as 
an agreement relating to the conveyance of land.”237 Notably, the plain 
language of this provision does not limit this conveyance of land to either 
(1) land as defined in the FCA or (2) land that is under condominium 
ownership.238 In Sterling, the ACPs were created by the declaration and 
were also described to the easement and cost–sharing that was attached to 
the declaration.239 A Florida court could uphold the ACP fee simple by 
finding that an enforceable agreement conveying the right to use and enjoy 
was in place. 
 
obligated to pay for its pro rata share of property taxes for airspace the hotel used above a 
sidewalk owned by the City of Miami). 
233 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 138 (permitting the Jacksonville Expressway Authority to take 
an airspace easement without taking the underlying real property); See Claughton, 157 So. 
2d at 198 (recognizing that the airspace above a parcel of land can be dominated and used 
by a party who does not own the parcel of land). 
234 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (resolving the dispute by applying the FCA after neither party 
asserted that the declaration was defective). 
235 Id. at 436 (finding that “irrespective of how the common law might have addressed 
separate owners of surface space and airspace, the disputed airspace in this case was 
identified and reserved via a declaration of condition and associated agreement recorded 
under chapter 718, Florida Statutes, which specifically addresses airspace.”). 
236 Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 624–25 (finding four documents—a declaration, a deed to 
an alternative commercial parcel, an operating agreement, and a marina agreement wherein 
the deed and declaration were subject to the operating agreement—resolved the dispute 
over wharfing and riparian rights). 
237 FLA. STAT. § 718.105(1) (2020) (providing that “[w]hen executed as required by s. 
718.104, a declaration together with all exhibits and all amendments is entitled to 
recordation as an agreement relating to the conveyance of land.”). 
238 FLA. STAT. § 718.103 (18) (providing that land “means the surface of a legally 
described parcel of real property and includes, unless otherwise specified in the declaration 
and whether separate from or including such surface, airspace lying above and subterranean 
space lying below such surface. However, if so defined in the declaration, the term “land” 
may mean all or any portion of the airspace or subterranean space between two legally 
identifiable elevations and may exclude the surface of a parcel of real property and may 
mean any combination of the foregoing, whether or not contiguous, or may mean a 
condominium unit.”). 
239 See Sterling, 255 So. 3d at 435. 
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A contract–based approach following Legendary could provide 
alternative grounds to upholding a fee simple for an excluded airspace 
parcel like the disputed ACPs in Sterling. Like the riparian land at issue in 
Legendary, the ACPs were both described in a declaration and were 
subject to certain burdens laid out in the easement that was attached to the 
declaration.240 Just as the Legendary court upheld the riparian right 
agreements as a matter of contract law without reference to the 
Condominium Act, the declaration and easement agreement in Sterling 
provide the necessary basis for applying a contract–based approach to 
ownership. While the riparian land at issue in Legendary does not run up 
against the ambiguity of airspace ownership at common law, the strong 
freedom of contract evidenced in Legendary suggests Florida courts will 
look to the form of a property interest conveyance—whether that form be 
a title, declaration, or other written agreement—rather than looking to the 
type of property being conveyed241. If the strict contract–based approach 
made available to Florida courts by Legendary were adopted in Sterling 
the declaration and the attached agreement could provide sufficient 
grounds to find an enforceable interest conveyed by contract.242 However, 
the uncertain status of airspace ownership under Florida common law may 
pose a hurdle to a pure contract–based approach. 
Even if the ACPs no longer benefited from the FCA’s codification of 
airspace fee simple ownership, Ervin and Claughton Hotels show that 
Florida law does recognize that some property rights can be held in 
airspace.243 While those cases were limited to easements involving 
airspace, both decisions show that airspace is subject to at least some of 
the benefits and burdens imposed on real property under Florida law. 
244Moreover, these decisions demonstrate that Florida courts recognize 
that property rights in airspace can be divided among several owners.245 
 
240 Legendary, 724 So.2d 625 (finding that because the rights assigned to the 
condominium owners and owners’ association in the declaration were subject to 
agreements that defined the “respective rights and obligations in the shared use of the 
property” that those agreements controlled a dispute over wharfing rights). 
241 Id. 
242 Id.; 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (finding that the description in the declaration was sufficient 
to bring the non–condominium parcels within the scope of the FCA and that a fee–sharing 
agreement between the non–condominium owner and the condominium owners’ 
association controlled a dispute concerning those fees). 
243 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 139 (finding that a property owner would be entitled to payment 
from a highway authority that takes an easement in airspace over that land); Claughton, 
157 So. 2d at 198 (finding that a hotel operating a building that occupied airspace above a 
city–owned sidewalk was obligated to pay its pro rata share of property tax attributable to 
that airspace usage). 
244 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 139; Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198. 
245 Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 (finding that, because a hotel was occupying and using 
airspace over a city–owned hotel, the hotel and not the City had to pay property tax 
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Recognizing property interests in airspace and permitting airspace to be 
divided among several owners are the two fundamental premises required 
for an airspace fee simple to be created at common law. 
While the Ervin court did not permit the Jacksonville Expressway 
Authority to take a fee simple absolute in airspace, the court did recognize 
that the right to use airspace could be partially separated from an intertest 
in the underlying land.246 Moreover, the court found that JAE condemning 
the airspace easement would be a taking which requires “full 
compensation” under Florida law.247 Although Ervin barred the creation 
of a fee simple absolute in airspace separate from the underlying land, the 
decision shows that Florida courts recognize a sufficient property interest 
in airspace to (1) permit the conveyance of a right to use airspace via an 
easement and (2) to require just compensation because the owner of the 
underlying land does have a right to exclude others from the adjoining 
airspace.248 
Claughton Hotel saw Florida courts move closer towards recognizing 
two distinct ownership interests in airspace when that airspace adjoins a 
single terrestrial parcel.249 In Claughton, the court affirmed that easement 
owner was only responsible for a pro rata share of property taxes that 
correlated to the owner’s partial access to and use of airspace above the 
easement.250 The Claughton court agreed that the hotel had exclusive use 
of airspace contained within the envelope of its building and that the 
municipality’s share of property taxes related to the easement should 
exclude amounts allocated to the airspace occupied by the hotel.251 While 
the Claughton court was considering an easement rather than a fee simple 
absolute, the decision shows that airspace can shared among two separate 
owners under Florida. Moreover, the decision shows that Florida law 
recognizes that these separate interests can entitle one owner to a larger 
portion of airspace adjoining a single terrestrial parcel. In Claughton, the 
hotel was permitted to enclose a portion of airspace with its building so as 
to have exclusive use of that airspace.252 In turn, because the hotel was 
using a larger share of the airspace, Florida law required the hotel to 
 
attributed to that airspace use); Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 139 (finding that a highway authority 
could condemn an airspace easement over privately–owned land). 
246 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 137–39. 
247 See id. at 139. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. (recognizing that airspace above a city–owned sidewalk had been enclosed by a 
building and therefore subject to the exclusive use of a hotel). 
250 See Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 197. 
251 See id. at 198 (finding that a hotel’s exclusive use of airspace must be accounted for 
when calculating the proportional share of taxes to be allocated to an easement held by the 
city). 
252 Id. 
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assume a proportionate share of the burdens associated with that exclusive 
use of airspace including property taxes.253 Claughton shows that the 
benefits and burdens of ownership associated with fee simples in land—
in this case, property taxes and the hotel’s right to exclude the municipality 
from the portion of airspace occupied by its building—also attach to 
airspace under Florida law. Moreover, the decision shows that Florida law 
permits airspace to divided among several owners who may each have 
exclusive use of that airspace. 
While neither Ervin nor Claughton Hotels, expressly permit fee 
simple absolute airspace ownership, both decisions show that Florida 
courts acknowledge property interests in airspace and permit property 
interests in airspace to be conveyed through written agreements.254 Far 
from foreclosing airspace ownership at common law, both cases establish 
that (1) property interests in airspace are recognized at common law and 
(2) property interests in airspace can be divided among several owners.255 
As Claughton Hotels shows, Florida courts recognized that the right to 
exclude and the right to use can attach to airspace. Moreover, Claughton 
shows that the extent of burdens imposed on airspace must correlate to the 
size of the benefits each airspace owner can derive from her parcel.256 As 
in Claughton Hotels, the disputed airspace parcels in Sterling were 
contained in discrete units inside of a building.257 Each of the Sterling 
parcels were conventional units separated from the condominium property 
by walls, floors, and ceilings. Like the hotel in Claughton, these 
architectural boundaries excluded neighboring airspace owners from using 
the ACPs.258 Unlike the airspace easement upheld in Ervin, the hotel in 
Claughton and the ACPs in Sterling placed airspace under the exclusive 
dominion of the respective owners by creating physical barriers between 
that airspace and surrounding airspace parcels.259 
 
253 Id. at 197–98. 
254 See Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 139 (concluding that the “property owner must be paid full 
compensation for any property, including easements, which is taken for the public use” by 
a municipal agency) 
255 Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 197–98 (resolving the airspace use and property tax dispute 
without turning to a statute); Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 138 (finding that an easement in airspace 
above privately–owned property could be created even if that airspace could not be 
condemned to create a fee simple absolute). 
256 Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 (finding that a hotel’s pro rate share of property taxes 
connected to its use of airspace above a city–owned sidewalk had to be determined by 
taking into account that both “the City was making no use of the building and should not 
be called upon to pay any portion of the taxes attributable thereto” and also accounting for 
the fact that both the hotel and the City made “some use of the part of the lot in question.”). 
257 255 So. 3d at 435 (noting that the disputed parcels were four separate units that were 
used as a wine bar, guest gym, laundry facility, and storage room). 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
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While a strict application of Ervin would prohibit a fee simple absolute 
in airspace, Ervin and Claughton shows that Florida law does contemplate 
some forms of airspace ownership.260 Recognizing a fee simple in airspace 
would have been a reasonable next step under Claughton. Moreover, even 
Ervin could permit non–condominium owners to own units in 
condominium buildings by relying on other fees like a fee simple 
defeasible. Condominium statutes were enacted in response to the 
common law’s preference for finding that only a defeasible fee can be 
granted to the owner of an upper–story parcel in a multi–story building.261 
Although defeasible fees offer fewer protections of an owner’s right to use 
her airspace if a building is destroyed, those fees would still permit owners 
of non–condominium parcels to enjoy the benefits of ownership without 
requiring a unit to come within the FCA’s scope. Even if Florida law does 
not permit fee simple airspace ownership, the recognition by the Ervin and 
Claughton courts that the right to use and the right to exclude attach to 
airspace itself can provide non–condominium airspace users with key 
protections under Florida law.262 
With the rights to use and to exclude others from airspace, the ability 
to sever airspace from the underlying land, and the permissibility of 
conveying at least some property rights in airspace through a written 
instrument all firmly established by Florida courts, the Sterling court had 
the necessary premises available to uphold the fee simples in airspace 
under Florida common law. As the Tatum Bros. court noted, under Florida 
law property ownership flows from a legal right to exercise dominion over 
a space.263 While the Tatum Bros. court could look to the deed held by the 
landowner, Ervin and Claughton showed at least some property rights—
the right to use and the right to exclude—can also attach to airspace 
through easement agreements. Permitting fee simple ownership of 
airspace in Sterling would have been in line with the recognition of key 
property rights in airspace by Florida courts and the general deference 
Florida courts grant contracts regulating ownership and use rights among 
several owners. Moreover, the very same public policy and economic 
interests that urged Florida courts to uphold certain property rights in 
airspace and also which spurred the nationwide adoption of condominium 
 
260 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 138 (finding that an airspace easement could be condemned over 
privately–owned land); Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198 (allocating property tax obligations 
attributable to airspace usage based on shared and exclusive use of that airspace). 
261 See Ball, supra note 21, at 624 (noting a “tendency” among U.S. courts to find the 
“right of ownership [in airspace, occupied by the floor of a building or a room,] would be 
defeated by the destruction of the building.”). 
262 Ervin, 139 So. 2d at 138; Claughton, 157 So. 2d at 198. 
263 See Tatum Bros. Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Watson, 109 So. 623, 626  (Fla. 
1926). 
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statutes could tip the scales in favor of airspace fee simple under Florida 
law.264 Although the Sterling court was able to uphold New Sterling’s fee 
simple in the excluded airspace parcels without relying on common law 
principles, Florida law does provide the tools necessary to permit fee 
simple in airspace if an airspace parcel is not within the Condominium 
Act’s reach. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Florida Condominium Act provides three key benefits to owners: 
the codification of fee simple in airspace and the ability to regulate 
property ownership and use with contracts.265 Sterling shows that Florida 
courts will extend the Condominium Act’s provisions to airspace parcels 
that may, at first blush, seem to be outside of the FCA’s scope. Sterling 
suggests that nearly any parcel described in a declaration can benefit from 
the FCA’s provisions, including the ownership of a fee simple in 
airspace.266 While, as this note shows, a fee simple in airspace may be 
possible under Florida common law, Sterling shows condominium 
developers and owners of excluded airspace parcels that the FCA’s 
protections can be relied on despite lingering ambiguity about fee simple 
airspace ownership at common law.267 Moreover, the decision shows that 
Florida courts will extend the contract–based approach to ownership 
articulated in Tatum Bros. and Legendary Yachts to mixed–use and 
mixed–ownership condominiums formed pursuant to the FCA. This 
contract–based approach provides condominium developers and owners 
with ample flexibility to privately regulate the benefits and burdens 
allotted to each owner while preserving the FCA’s two most important 
benefits: the codification of fee simple in airspace and the ability to tailor 
usage agreements to the needs of all airspace owners who share the same 
 
264 See Condominium Regulation, supra note 2, at 641 (explaining that builders, lenders, 
and title companies often relied upon newly enacted legislation to “assure the safety of 
their investments” prior to committing any financing towards development). 
265 Legendary, 724 So. 2d.at 625–26 (finding that because the declaration was subject to 
an operating agreement between the parties the rights and obligations created by those 
agreements governed the dispute). 
266 255 So. 3d at 436–37 (finding that identification of non–condominium parcels in a 
declaration was sufficient to bring those parcels into the FCA’s scope). 
267 255 So. 3d at 436 (making no finding on whether Florida common law permits 
airspace fee simple and finding that, “irrespective of how the common law might have 
addressed separate owners of surface space and airspace, the disputed airspace this case 
was identified and reserved via a declaration of condominium and associated agreement 
recorded under” the FCA so ownership dispute depended on the FCA). 
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building.268 Sterling should reassure condominium developers and owners 
that Florida courts will continue deferring to contracts that regulate land 
use in a condominium building. The strong protections extended to non–
condominium airspace parcels and the contract–based approach taken by 
the Sterling court both signal that Florida courts have a flexible 
understanding of the FCA that accommodates both mixed–use and mixed–
ownership buildings. Moreover, property interests in airspace recognized 
by Florida courts may provide a path to create fee simple absolute in 
airspace outside of the FCA. However, given the benefits of fee simple 
absolute, Sterling is an encouraging sign that Florida courts will extend 
the FCA’s provisions to give owners of non–condominium parcels in 
condominium–dominated buildings the full benefit of a fee simple that can 
withstand common law challenges. Sterling shows that Florida courts are 
responsive to new developments in airspace use trends that have shifted 
towards mixed–use and mixed–ownership vertical developments. As new 
airspace uses emerge, Sterling signals that Florida courts will retain a 
contract–based approach that encourages private regulation of airspace use 




268 Id.at 437 (holding that a written agreement providing for fee–sharing between the 
non–condominium owner and condominium owners’ association controlled a dispute over 
those fees). 
